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APPEAL-PARTY IN INTEREST-JURISDICTION.-STATE V. SANDERS, 35 .So.
509 (LA.).-A tax collector prescribed a mode in which taxes should be paid
and refused to receive those tendered in any other mode. The district court
issued a peremptory mandamus to compel him to receive taxes differently
tendered. Held, that, under a statute limiting the right of appeal to cases
involving large sums, the tax collector had no interest sufficient to give him
the right of appeal. Blanchard, J., dissenting.
Under such statutes a constitutional question involving a smaller amount
way be appealed. New Orleans v. Arthurs, 36 La. Ann. 98. But mode of
paying taxes has sometimes been held not to be a constitutional question.
Cobb v. McGuire, 36 La. Ann. 8ol. However, statutes limiting the right of
appeal are construed liberally. San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 43 Cal.
515; Shelton v. Wade, 4 Tex. 148. Besides, unless the statute expressly limits
the right of appeal to one party, both have the right. The Sidney, 139 U. S.
336. And in Louisiana there are cases deciding that where one party has an
appealable interest the other ipso facto has the right of appeal. Handy v.
New Orleans, 39 La. Ann. lO7; State v. Judge, 23 La. Ann. 761. Since, then,
the majority of the court admit that the plaintiff would have had the right
to appeal, had he lost, it would seem as if the defendant should have had the
right.
BANKRUPTCY-OMESTEAD--JURISDICTION.-INGRAM V. WILSON, II AM. B.
R. 192 (C. C. A.).-Held, that the homestead of a bankrupt does not vest in
the trustee in bankruptcy and that to enforce a privileged debt suit must be
brought in the State courts.
The Bankruptcy Act does not affect property exempt under State laws,
Act i898, sec. 17. But, of course, such property is not exempt from privi-
leged debts. Therefore, on this account, there would have been good reason
for federal courts' jurisdiction in cases like the present, and also because the
trustee in bankruptcy has at least temporary control of the debtor's horme-
stead. Robinson v. Wilson, 15 Kan. 595. It has been held, too, that the
trustee represents the general rights of creditors. In re St. Helen Mill Co.,
3 Sawy. 88; In re Gurney, 7 Bliss 414. However, under the bankruptcy act
of 1867 exempt property was without the control of the federal courts. In
re Bass, 3 Woods 382. And such has been the rule under the act of i898.
In re Woodruff, 96 Fed. 317; Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, i9o U. S. 294.
The same rule would apply, as was held in the present case, to a privileged
debt as to a waiver.
BANKRUPTCY-TRuSTEE-FRAuDULENT CoNVEYANcE--TRACING Fuiws.-
WELCH v. POLLEY, ii Ams. B. K. 215 (N. Y.).-A trustee, about to become
bankrupt, fraudulently conveyed part of the real estate which he held in
trust. His trustee in bankruptcy sued the vendee and recovered. Held, that
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the cestui que trust may recover the proceeds from the trustee and his
trustee in bankruptcy.
The decision of the Supreme Court, which is here reversed, 86 App. Div.
260, was to the effect that the right of the cestui que trust was against the
real estate in the hands of the third party and not against the trustee.
Cases are there cited showing that where money is paid by A to B, who has
a just claim, but where C is in fact legally entitled, C must sue A and has
no cause of action against B. Butterworth v. Gould, 41 N. Y. 450; Hathaway
v. Homer, 54 N. Y. 655. But in respect to property the rule is different.
Property may usually be followed into whatsoever form it can be traced.
Church v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348; Street v. Nelson, 8o Ala. 23o. In a case similar
to the present one, Re Mulligan, 116 Fed. 715, no action lay against the trustee
in bankruptcy, but it was not distinctly proved that the money he received
was the proceeds of the property of the plaintiff. In the present case the
proceeds were traced directly into the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy.
Therefore, although some cases hold that, since it was mingled with other
funds, it lost its identity, and the cestui que trust was in no better position
than the other creditors, Steamboat Co. v. Locke, 73 Me. 37o, yet the general
rule is, that such money may be recovered in preference to other debts.
Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. :272; Trust Co. v. St. Louis, etc., Co., 99 Fed. 4851.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NEGROES As GRAND JURORS-INQUIRY OF FEDERAL
COURT INTo RuLEs OF LoCAL PRACicE.-RoGERs v. ALABAMA, 24 SUP. CT. 257.
-Plaintiff in error made a motion, two printed pages in length, to quash an
indictment, because of the exclusion of negroes from the grand jury list,
alleging that this was due to the inequality of his race under the State
constitution. The State court struck the motion from the files, under color
of local practice, on the ground of prolixity. Held, that this was a violation
of the Fotirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that whoever,
while representing a State in an official capacity, deprives another of his
legal rights, thereby violates the Fourteenth Amendment, whether this be
done with or without the authority of the State laws. Ex parte v. Virginia,
100 U. S. 339; Trauder v. W. Va., ioo U. S. 3o3; Neal v. Delaware, IO3 U. S.
370; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565. And the same court will freely
examine the validity of -the pleadings, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence,
when a constitutional question is involved. U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 709; Boyd
v. Thayer, 143 U. S. -i8o; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Osborn v.
Florida, i6oU. S. 650; McLaughlin v. Fowler, i54 U. S. 663. Nor will it
hesitate, to look behind any disguise assumed by a State court. Neal v. Dela-
ware, supra; Mitchell v. Clark, ioo U. S. 645. A prisoner has a constitutional
right to offer evidence in support of a motion to quash the indictment which
charges that he has -been discriminated against because of race. Smith v.
Mississippi, 162 U. S. 6Ol; Willianis v. Mississippi, 1170 U. S. 213; Carter v.
Texas, 177 U. S. 442. The principal case extends this rule even to a motion
that may seem superfluous, so long as it is not irrelevant. This is holding
merely that the criminal has a right to prove his case, however weak it may
seem. But see Calwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692.
CoNSTiTuTIoNAL LAw-CoRP0RATIONS-FULl. FAITH AND CREDIT To FoR-
EIGN JUDGMENTs.-ANGLo-AuEBICAN Pxov. Co. v. DAVIs PRov. Co., 24 Sup.
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CT. 92.-New York Code Civ. Proc., see. i78o, provides that suits between
foreign corporations can be maintained only when the cause of action arises
within the State. This statute is interpreted by the New'York courts as
precluding an action on the judgment of a sister State by one foreign cor-
poration against another. Held, not to violate Art. 4, sec. I, U. S. Const.,
guaranteeing full faith and credit to such judgments.
The constitutional provision establishes a rule of evidence rather than of
jurisdiction. Wisconsin v. Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265. While, generally, a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of a foreign juris-
diction, Insurance Co. v. Harris, 97 U. S. 331, yet the court of the former may
investigate the jurisdiction of the court where decision was rendered,
Thompson v. Whitman, I8 Wall. 457. The Constitution does not require a
State to give jurisdiction against its will, Missouri v. Lewis, ioi U. S. 22;
but when jurisdiction is acquired, the Constitution determines the effect of
the judgment.
CoNTRAcrs-DIscHAGE--AccoRD AND SATISFACTIoN-TENDER UPON CON-
DITION.-NEELY v. THoMPSON, 75 PAC. 117 (KAN.).-Defendant sent plaintiff
statement of account, with $7.90 "in full satisfaction of balance due." Plaintiff
cashed the check, which contained the words, "Balance in full for fees," but
at the same time wrote to defendant denying that his claims were so satisfied.
Held, that the creditor was bound to understand that, if he accepted the
check, he took it subject to the condition that it should be in full settlement
of the demand. Mason, J., dissenting.
Where an offer of an accord is made upon the condition that it be taken
in full of all demands, the party to whom it is made has no alternative but
to refuse it, or accept it upon such condition; and if he takes it, no protest
or declaration made by him at the time can'affect the case. Bull v. Bull, 43
Conn. 455. He cannot accept the benefit and reject the condition. He who
tenders the money owns it, and has the right to say on what condition it shall
be received. Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326; Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y.
231. "Always the manner of the tender and of the payment shall be directed
by him that maketh the tender or payment, and not by him that accepteth it."
PinneP's Case, 5 Co. 117. The dissenting opinion seems to overlook the fact
that the ownership of the money does not change till the condition has been
accepted; and, while admitting the weight of authority to be otherwise, holds
that where the money paid is for a portion of the debt admittedly due, no
consideration exists for the release of the portion in dispute.
EVIDENcE-CASH REGISTER RFcORDS-MEMORANDA AS INDEPENDENT Evi-
DENCE.-CULLINAN V. MoNcasmF, 85 N. Y. SuPP. 745.-Cash register records,
introduced to sustain testimony of a party to a transaction, held, inadmissible.
At first sight it would seem that the records of a cash register, preserved
by way of accounts, are so closely analagous to the records in shop-books as to
come under the rule which admits the latter as evidence. McKelvey on Evi-
dence, sec. 163. Because such records contain the element of "daily routine
of business," which the decisions seem-to deem essential to the reliability of
such evidence. Prince v. Smith, 4 Mass. 455. But the rule is confined to
shop-books with great strictness. Richardson v. Emery, 23 N. H. 220; Kotwitz
v. Wright, 37 Tex. 82. And-it is evident that cash register records could not
be received, on any other grounds, as independent evidence, or even in an
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auxiliary way unless the witness could not otherwise remember the trans-
action. People v. McLoughlin, ISO N. Y. 365.
EviDENcE-IMPEACHING WrITNEss-P vIous STATEMENTS-REFRESHING
MEmORY.-PEoPLE v. CREEKs, 75 PAC. iOI (CAT-.).-In a murder trial, the
State called as a witness the mother of the accused. Her testimony at the
inquest had been material toward showing the prisoner's guilt. To the
surprise of the State, she now failed to repeat that testimony, alleging that
doubts of its truth had arisen in her mind. Held, that as she had not made
statements to the damage of the State at the trial, but had merely failed to
aid in the proof, she could not be made to testify as to what her former
evidence had been. Van Dyke, J., dissenting.
Such proceedings would be an attempt to substitute former for present
testimony. Comm. v. Phelps, IT Gray 73. Of themselves, former incon-
sistent statements of a witness are irrelevant to the question of guilty or not
guilty, though they tend to impeach his credit. A witness cannot be ques-
tioned in regard to such statements, by the party who called him, though he
swore to them before the grand jury. People v,. Safford, 5 Denio xia,-a case
parallel to the present case, save that no bias of witness appeared. A witness,
-whichever party calls him--cannot be impeached unless he has given testi-
mony against the impeaching party. People v. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 55o. The
right of counsel to refresh the memory of a witness in no way depends on
the surprise which his testimony may have created, and a witness who has
omitted details should not be asked whether he had not testified to the omitted
details before the committing magistrate or grand jury. Putnam v,. U. S.,
162 U. S. 697, 7o5.
DEED OPERATING AS A MORTGAGE-OPTION TO PURcHAsE-REIcH v. DYm
ET Au, 86 N. Y. Sup. 544-Plaintiff being indebted to the defendant, executed
a deed of property giving the latter an option to purchase at a price fixed in
the deed within a year. Held, that such a deed was in fact a mortgage.
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
The dissenting opinion is the more reasonable one. From the facts,
which are not clear, it seems that the parties intended an absolute deed to be
made to defendant's testatrix, on condition that within a year she accept
the property at an agreed price. Upon failure to purchase, defendant's
testatrix was to become mortgagee. They could not have intended the
transaction to operate as a mortgage, because if it operated as such, it could
never become an absolute conveyance. "Once a mortgage always a mortgage,"
I lones on Mort., par. 7; Bisp. on Eq., see. 153. Every conveyance of land
accompanied by a conditional agreement is not necessarily a mortgage.
Baker v. Thrasher, 4 Denio 493; Macaulay v,. Porter, 71 N. Y. 173. The
intention of the parties should govern. Hughes v. Shaff, 19 Ia. 335; Foley
v'. Kirk, 33 N. J. Eq. 17o. The defendant's testatrix impliedly accepted the
option to purchase at the end of the year, on the ground of estoppel by con-
duct. Wash. on Real Prop., sec. 1914; Bigelow on Estoppel, 454.
HomIciDE-SEU'-DFmsE-NECESSrTY oF RETREAT.-STATE V. CASTLE, 46
S. E. I (N. C.).-Where it appeared that the accused, who was the foreman
of a lumber camp, shot two of the hands during a difficulty commenced by
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the latter, held, that if the foreman was where he had a right to be he was
not required to retreat before firing in self-defense.
Following the English doctrine, many of the American courts hold that
a homicide will not be excused on the ground of self-defense unless the
slayer does that which is reasonably in his power to avoid the necessity of
extreme resistance; he should retreat to the wall or other impediment before
dealing a deadly blow. Pond v. State, 8 Mich. 150; State v. Harper, i Edm.
Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) i8o; Pierson v,. State, 12 Ala. x49. But the prevailing
view in this country is that the slayer need not retreat where the attack is
violent and with a deadly weapon. Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550;
Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 8o; Tweedy v. State, 5 Ia. (Clarke) 433; State ;V.
Ellenger, i Brewst. (Pa.) 352. Where a man is attacked in his own house
he is not bound to save himself by flight or retreat before taking life if this
is necessary to protect himself or his home from forcible entry. Alberty v.
United States, 162 U. S. 499; State v. Middleham, 62 Iowa i5o; Willis v.
State, 43 Neb. io2. In Ohio it has been held that homicide may be justified
on the ground of self-defense without showing either that -fhe slayer previ-
ously retreated or that such retreat was impracticable. State v'. Noble, i
Ohio, Dec. i, and a like rule prevails in Texas by virtue of statute regulation,
Williams v'. State, 30 Tex. App. 429; Penal Code 573.
INSURANCE-LOSS BY FIREn-PARTNERSHIP---CHANGE OF INTEREST.-RoYAL
INS. Co. v. MARTIN, 24 Sup. CT. 247.-Plaintiff insured his entire stock in
trade under a policy providing that the risk should cease "to be in force as
to any property insured which should pass from the insured to any other
person otherwise than by operation of law," unless the approval of the insurer
was secured. Plaintiff took his sons into the firm and himself became a
silent partner, without such approval. Held, that the plaintiff could not
recover even on his own interest in the partnership.
Insurance policies in case of doubt are to be construed in favor of the
insured. Hoffman v. Aetna Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 4o5. And it is well settled
that a partner has an insurable interest in the partnership property to the
extent of his interest, Converse v. Citizens Ins. Co., io Cush. 37; Peck v. Ins.
Co., 22 Conn. 575; Wood, Fire Ins. (2d ed.), sec. 298. In most States it has
been held that the sale of his interest by one partner to his co-partner.was
not such an alienation as was forbidden by a clause similar to the above, when
no approval was secured. Powers v. Guardian F. & L. Ins. Co., 136 Mass.
io8; Pierce a'. Nashua Ins. Co., 50 N. H. 297; Lockwood a'. Middlesex Ins.
Co., 47 Conn. 553. But the contract of insurance is personal and the intro-
duction of a new member into a firm may often increase the risk. The
insurer therefore has a right to demand that he be consulted. Malley v'. Ins.
Co., 51 Conn. 222; Richards, Ins., see. 33: While the insured, as partner, still
retains an interest in the property, it is a joint, and entirely different, interest
from the one insured. The present decision accords with the general rule,
although the opposite is held in Cowen v. Iowa Ins. Co., 40 Iowa 55; Black-
well '. Ins. Co., 48 0. S. 533.
JUDGmENT-FALsE RETuPjN-ImPrAcHiNG RE=CD.-GRAHAX v. LOH, 69
N. E. 474 (IND.).-An action was brought to vacate a judgment for fraud
predicated on a false return of the officer, the defendant not having been
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
served with summons. Held, that unless the holder of the judgment had-
been guilty of fraud the action could not be maintained. Wiley, J., dissenting.
This decision is opposed to the prevailing view. Black on Judgments,
sec. 377; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 495; Ridgeway v. Bank, ii Humph.
(Tenn.) 523; Kibbe v. Benson, 84 U. S. 629. According to these authorities
the defendant may have relief whenever he has not been guilty of any fault.
Such a proceeding is to be regarded as a direct attack upon the judgment.
Cotterall v. Koon, 151 Ind. 182. The only Indiana case at all similar, Nealis
v. Dick, 72 Ind. 378, in which it was held that because the prevailing party
was guilty of fraud the judgment ought to be set aside. The principal case
is, however, not unsupported. Walker v. Robbins, 55 U. S. 584; Knox City
v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152; Taylor z. Lewis, 1g Am. Dec. 135; the doctrine
of these cases being based upon public policy.
MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS--COPYRIGHT-IMTAToN.-BLoom v. NIXON, 125
FED. 977.-Plaintiffs were ownlers of a copyrighted song which was rendered
during the performance of a musical comedy by an actress. Held, that an
imitation of the actress while singing such song, by another actress, in which
she attempted to mimic the gestures of the original actress, and used only a
portion of the song, was not within the statute prohibiting the performance,
without the consent of the proprietor, of an dramatic or musical composition
for which a copyright had been obtained.
The case proceeds upon the theory that it was the gestures which were
represented through the medium of the song and these were not protected
by the copyright. We find no cases in which this precise question has been
considered. In the case of Martinetti v. Maguire, I Abb. (U. S.) 356, a bill
to enjoin the reproduction of spectacular effects was dismissed, but questions
of morality were also involved. The general rule is that any use of the
original production, other than by multiplying it, as by public recitations,
does not constitute an infringement of a copyright. High on Injunctions,
sec. iO7.
NATURALIZATION-REQUIREMENT OF STATE STATUTE-PERJURY IN STATE
CouRT-JuRIsDIcIoN OF FEDERAL COURT.-UNITED STATES V. SEVERINO, 125
FED. 949.-In addition to the requirements of the United States law relative
to naturalization, a State passed an act providing for the filing of a petition,
accompanied by an affidavit of a citizen. Held, that perjury committed in
making this affidavit was not punishable in the federal courts.
In New York it has been declared that a State court, acting under the
naturalization laws of the United States, acts as the agent of the federal
government and has no jurisdiction to punish criminal offenses against the
United States, those being exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. In re Ramsden, 13 How. Prac. 429. In such other courts as have
considered ihe question, it was held that false swearing, in naturalization
proceedings, in State courts, is perjury at common law, and may be punished
by the State as well as by the federal courts. Comm. v. Fuller, 8 Metc. (Mass.)
313; Sutton v. State, 9 Ohio 133. The principal case carries the latter rule
one step farther in giving the State courts exclusive jurisdiction to punish
perjury committed where, although acting in naturalization proceedings, they
are acting, pursuant to a State law.
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AILROADS-NEGLIGENCE-PEDESTRIANs-DuTY TO KEEP A. LOOKOUT.-
MCCLANAHAN V. VICKSBURG, 35 So. 903 (L.).-While intoxicated, a man
entered upon a railroad track in the daytime in the open country and fell
on the track. While lying in this position he was killed by a train, the
engineer not seeing him until within a short distance. Held, that, while the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, the failure of the engineer to
keep a closer lookout was such negligence as to justify i recovery. Provosity,
3., dissenting.
Whether a railroad company is liable to a trespasser to maintain a strict
lookout is a widely disputed question. Yarmal v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 575; Smith
v. Railroad, 14 N. C. 728; Pattop v. Railroad, 89 Tenn. 370; Memphis & C. R.
Co. v. Womack, 84 Ala. i49; Denman v. St. P. & D. R. Co., 26 Minn. 357.
And even while it may owe such a duty to its passengers, this does not imply
a corresponding duty toward a trespasser. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v.
Kelly, 35 C. C. A. 571. It would seem that in the States where such a liability
is placed upon the railroad company, a like responsibility would rest upon a
trespasser, since the danger is equally obvious to either. But in such a case
it has been held that if the engineer, in the exercise of reasonable care, might
have avoided the accident, the company will be liable. B. & 0. R. Co. v.
Hellenthal, 31 C. C. A. 414; Kirthy v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co., 65 Fed. 386; B.
& 0. R. Ca. v. Anderson, 85 Fed. 413; Chicago, N. W. R. Co. v. Donahue, 75
Ill. io6; Wood, R. Law (2d ed.), 1468. This would seem to be a reasonable
rule, since no one is justified by the negligence of another in taking his life,
through either intent or negligence. The question of the responsibility of a
railroad company to a trespasser to maintain a lookout is entirely unsettled,
but once the danger is discovered, nothing less than the utmost efforts to pre-
vent the accident will relieve it.
STREET AND INTERURBAN RAILROAD--ANNEXED TERRITORY-CONTRACTS.-
IND. Ry. Co. v. HOFFMAN, 69 N. E. 399 (IN.).-There was a contract between
a city and a street railway company by which the company agreed to trans-
port passengers on transfers upon any of its lines within the city limits,
Held, that where the city subsequently in the exercise of its governmental
power extended its limits, the company was bound to carry passengers upon its
interurban line to the new city limits without extra charge.
This seems to be the first decision on this point in this court. The case
holds that a city may increase the benefits which it derives from a contract
without the consent of the other party on the ground that the possible exercise
of this governmental power of extension must have been in contemplation of
the parties. It is well established that the contract of a municipality cannot
be altered or abrogated without the consent of both parties. 2o Am. & Eng.
Ency., 1157; Sawyer v. Concordia, 12 Fed. Rep. 754; Nelson v. Parish, iii U.
S. 716. A city is not excused from its contract where it fails to exercise its
governmental power and as a result is unable to receive any benefit from the
contract. Murray v. Kansas City, 47 Mo. App. io5. As tending to support
the present decision it has been held that a legislative act modifying the
territorial limits of a city is not unconstitutional although it operates, to
decrease the security of prior creditors. State v. Lake City, 25 Minn. 4o4;
Wade v. City of Richmond, i8 Gratt. (Va.) 583. The court in the principal
case relies almost entirely upon the principle that municipal ordinances be-
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come operative within the annexed territory as a natural consequence of the
annexation. Toledo v. Edens, .59 Ia. 352.
STREET RAILWAYS-RIDING ON CAR STEPs-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES.-
MosxowITz V. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R Co., 85 N. Y. SupP. 96o.-Held, that a
person who elects to ride on the steps of a crowded street car, and who is
thrown off by the oscillation of the car while it is running at the customary
rate of speed, assumes the risk of injuries so occasioned. Hirschberg and
Woodward, JJ., dissenting.
While riding on the platform or steps of a steam railroad car is generally
regarded as negligence per se, Goodwin v. R. Co., 84 Me. 203, it is not so con-
sidered as to street cars, Cummings v. R. Co., i66 Mass. 220. In many cases,
however, it is said to constitute such negligence as to preclude a recovery for
resulting injuries, unless the crowded condition of the car makes it necessary:
Thom v. Traction Co., i9i Pa. St. 249; Archer v. R. Co., 87 Mich. ioi. In
Ayers v. R. Co., 156 N. Y. io4, it was held that a passenger on a street car
assumes the risks ordinarily incident thereto, and the tendency of the New
York decisions seems to in harmony with this view. The dissenting opinion
in the present case contends that a common carrier inviting a passenger for
hire to occupy a precarious position upon the platform impliedly represents
that the car will be so run as to insure his safety. See Nolan v. R. Co., 87
N. Y. 63; Wilde v. R. Co., 163 Mass. 533; Pomashi v. Grant, ui9 Mich. 675.
SURETIES-OBTAINING PREFERENCES-INUREMIENT TO CO-SUREIES.-CAM-
PAU v. Dmrtoir DRmVNG Citu, 98 N. W. 267 (MIc,.).-A part of the sureties
on a forfeited bond liquidated their pro rata share of the indebtedness, sub-
sequently levying on the property of the principal. Held, that the assets so
required did not inure to the benefit- of the co-sureties. Hooker, C. J., and
Montgomery, J., dissenting.
The court reasonsthat the relation of co-suretyship was severed upon pay-
ment by part of the sureties of their proportion of the principal debt. They
then apply the doctrine that indemnity given to the surety after the debt has
been discharged does not inure to the benefit of co-sureties, Gould v. Fuller,
18 Me. 364; Moore v. Isley, 22 N. C. 374. While the general rule is that in-
demnity obtained by one of several sureties prior to the determination of the
relation is subject to the claim of all, Guild v. Butler, 127 Mass. 386; Berridge
v. Berridge, 44 Ch. Div. 168; yet when the debt is paid in equal proportion,
the equities cease, and co-sureties are not entitled to share in the indemnity
subsquently obtained from the principal, Messer v. Swan, 4 N. H. 481. The
dissenting opinion points out that the doctrine followed has been applied only
in those instances where the full amount of the debt was paid; whereas in
the present case only a pro rata share was liquidated; and contends that equity
should not ingraft upon the general rule an exception that will enable one
co-surety to overreach another.
TRUSTS-SAVINGS BANK-DEPoSITS IN TRUST FOR ANOTHER-IN RE Tor-
TEN, 85 N. Y. SupP. 928.-Where one deposits funds in trust for another, with-
out knowledge of beneficiary, and subsequently withdraws such accounts,
held, that, after the depositor's death, the cestui que trust can recover from
the estate of the deceased the amount of the deposits.
This class of voluntary trusts has given rise to an irreconcilable conflict
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of opinion. The decision follows the liberal New York doctrine, well ex-
emplified in Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, which apparently has found favor
in some other jurisdictions: Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Ray v. Sim-
mons, 1x R. L 266; Gaffnes Estate, 146 Pa. St. 49. The Massachusetts
courts, on the other hand, -have declared that a deposit by one as a trustee
will not be sufficient to create an irrevocable trust; that, to make the delivery
effectual, the donor must gart with every vestige of dominion over the prop-
erty: Sherman v. Bank, 138 Mass. 581; Clark v. Clark, 1o8 Mass. 522. The
weight of authority seems to support the Massachusetts rule: Roblinson v.
Ring, 72 Me. i4o; Davis v. Bank, 53 Mich. 163; Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St.
462; Schollmier v. Schollmier, 78 Iowa 426; Smith v. Speer, 34 N. J. Eq. 336;
and even in New York there is a strong tendency to renounce the broad
doctrine followed in the main case: Beaver v'. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421; Cun-
ningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43.
WATEm CouRsEs-PAIoL LIcENS.-IRmzvocA= GPANT-ItGATIo.---
MAPLE ORCHAnD CO. V. MARSHALL, 75 PAC. 369 (UTA).--Held, that a parol
license to enter on land to construct a pipe line for purposes of irrigation
operates as an irrevocable grant, after entry and construction of the pipe line
at considerable expense and after commencing the use of the water.
This court is so far favorable to irrigation projects as to hold that the
taking of property for the purpose of carrying water for the irrigatiorf of an
'otherwise unproductive farm is a taking for a public use, justifying the
invocation of eminent domain. Mash v. Clark, 75 Pac. 371. A parol license
to do a certain act or succession of acts on the land of another is in all
cases revocable, so far as it remains unexecuted, or so far as any future
enjoyment of the easement is concerned, at the will of the licensor, even
where the licensee has made an expenditure of money upon the land of the
licensor upon the faith of the license. Houston v. Laffee, 46 N. H. 5o7. So
where the expenditure is trifling, Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 3. This
seems the general rule, but many cases support the present court. Thus, a
parol license for a party-wall is taken out of the statute of frauds by its exe-
cution. Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335. Where money has been expended
on the faith of such license, so that the parties cannot be placed in statu quo,
equity grants relief as in any other case of part performance of a parol con-
tract for the sale of land, upon the ground of preventing fraud. Prince v.
Case, io Conn. 375.
WInT--VADITY-NON-CONTINGENT CLAus.-REDHEAD v. REDHEAD, 35
So. 761 (ALA.).-Held, that an instrument beginning, "Realizing the uncer-
tainty of life at all times, and the dangers incident to travel, I leave this as a
memoranda of my wishes should anything happen to me during my proposed
trip," is a valid will, although the testator did not die until after his return
from the trip referred to.
The question involved in such a will is whether the testator intended the
validity of the will to be contingent upon the happening of the condition
therein named, or merely to show the circumstances under which the will
was made. Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen 192; Schouler, Wills (2d ed.), sec. 286.
The English rule very strongly favors construing a will as non-contingent
whenever this can be done reasonably. Porter, Goods of, L. R. 2 P. & D. 22.
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And the rule is sometimes strained in its application. Dobson's Case, L. R.
i P. & M. 88; Martin's Case, L. P. i P. & M. 388. The same preference for
non-contingent wills is found in the American decisions, but the difficulty of
its application under varying circumstances makes the results most incon-
sistent when compared. Cody V. Conly, 27 Gratt. 313; Redfleld, Wills (2d
ed.), 176; Schoder, Wills, sec. 288. In the leading case of French v. French,
27 W. Va. 432, a will is held non-contingent which is worded: "Let all men
know hereby, if I get drowned this morning, March 7, I872, that I bequeath,"
etc.; whereas in Dougherty v. Dougherty, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 25, a will is held
conditional which reads: "As I intend starting in a few days for the State
of Missouri, and should anything happen that I should not return alive, my
wish is," etc. Many of the decisions turn on finely drawn distinctions. The
principal case fairly represents the borderland between contingent and non-
contingent wills. Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174; Robnett v. Ashlock, 49 Mo.
171; Ex parte Lindsay, 2 Bradf. (N. Y.) 204; Morrow's Appeal, 116 Pa. St.
440.
